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Abstract
This article discusses the application that was recently lodged with the European 
Court of Human Rights alleging that Italy is responsible for its involvement in pull-
backs by the Libyan coast guard. It places the case in the wider context of migration 
control policies and the Hirsi case in particular. The article examines different pullback 
scenarios which feature in the application lodged with the Court, and discusses dif-
ferent ways in which the Court can address the issues raised. The analysis focuses 
particularly on the question whether the Court is likely to find that Italy exercises 
jurisdiction and whether Italy could incur derived responsibility for its involvement in 
the pullbacks. The article concludes by suggesting that holding Italy responsible would 
require the Court to move beyond established precedent in its case-law. Although this 
is a move which can be difficult to make given the political tide in Europe, it would not 
be the first time that the Court takes its case-law, and thereby human rights protection, 
a step further.
Keywords
European Court of Human Rights – pullbacks – migration control – Hirsi – Italy – 
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1 Introduction*
In 2008 Italy and Libya signed a Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation aimed at preventing irregular migration from Libya to Italy. 
Under that agreement, Italy carried out several naval operations whereby it 
intercepted irregular migrants and returned them to Libya.1 These were con-
demned by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) in the case 
of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy.2 The Friendship Treaty was suspended in 
2011 due to the civil unrest in Libya. However, in February 2017 Italy and Libya 
concluded a new memorandum of understanding. Under this new agreement, 
Italy provides support to the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG), which intercepts mi-
grant boats which try to cross from Libya to Italy, and returns the passengers to 
Libya.3 In this context, an application was filed with the ECtHR, arguing that 
Italy is responsible for a fatal rescue incident involving an Italian and Libyan 
vessel, as a result of which at least twenty migrants died and survivors suffered 
severe human rights violations in Libya.4 This raises the following questions: 
how will the Court decide in this case? Will it find, as it did in Hirsi, that Italy 
breached its obligations under the Convention? Or will it find that these facts 
do not trigger Italy’s responsibility?
The aim of this article is to explore the different ways in which the Court may 
choose to address this new case, rather than making a particular suggestion on 
*   The author would like to thank the participants of the seminar on ‘Controlling Migration 
through Cooperation’ held at Tilburg University on 2 February 2018 for the feedback received. 
Special thanks go to Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Conny Rijken, Maarten den Heijer and 
Thomas Spijkerboer. Any remaining mistakes are my own.
1   In this article, the word ‘migrant’ refers to irregular migrants who attempt to cross the 
Mediterranean Sea from Italy to Libya. This includes asylum seekers who may be entitled to 
refugee status or subsidiary protection.
2   Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy [GC] App no 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012).
3   On Italian-Libyan cooperation to control migration flows see: F. Mussi & N.F. Tan, Comparing 
Cooperation on Migration Control: Italy-Libya and Australia-Indonesia, in: F. de Londras & 
S. Mullally (Eds), Irish Yearbook of International Law 2015, Vol. 10 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2017); C. Heller & L. Pezzani, Mare Clausum: Italy and the EU’s Undeclared Operation to Stem 
Migration across the Mediterranean, Forensic Oceanography, May 2018, https://www.forensic 
-architecture.org/case/sea-watch/ (accessed 23 May 2018); M. Giuffré, State Responsibility 
Beyond Borders: What Legal Basis for Italy’s Push-backs to Libya?, 24(4) International Journal 
of Refugee Law 2012, p. 692–734.
4   Global Legal Action Network, Legal Action Against Italy over its Coordination of Libyan Coast 
Guard Pull-backs Resulting in Migrant Deaths and Abuse (London: GLAN, 8 May 2018), http://
www.glanlaw.org/single-post/2018/05/08/Legal-action-against-Italy-over-its-coordination-
of-Libyan-Coast-Guard-pull-backs-resulting-in-migrant-deaths-and-abuse (accessed 22 May 
2018).
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how it should decide. The latter would arguably be premature, as the case is 
only in its early stages and hence any analysis remains speculative. Moreover, 
in terms of scholarly examination the chosen approach offers more opportu-
nity for discussing various strands of case-law on which the Court could draw 
and reflecting on academic debates surrounding key issues.
As the facts of the new application include different aspects which are rele-
vant for the question of Italy’s responsibility, discussing them separately helps 
clarify the analysis. Moreover, various other interceptions by the LCG have also 
been reported, suggesting specific patterns of Italian involvement.5 The analy-
sis will therefore explore various scenarios in turn, since, in addition to being 
relevant for the case pending before the ECtHR, these or similar incidents 
could give rise to another application being brought to the ECtHR.
The analysis is limited to the responsibility of Italy, as it is the only respon-
dent State in both the Hirsi and the new case, and does not discuss the pos-
sible responsibility of other actors. Likewise, this article focuses principally 
on the ECtHR’s own case-law rather than that of other bodies, as this is what 
the Court itself does, while acknowledging that a complete analysis of issues 
such as jurisdiction and State responsibility would need to look beyond the 
ECtHR’s case-law. Due to the limited scope of this article the analysis focuses 
on Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treat-
ment), although it is acknowledged that other rights may also be at stake, such 
as the prohibition of collective expulsions, the right to life, the prohibition of 
slavery and forced labour, the right to liberty and security, the right to leave and 
the right to an effective remedy.6 Last, adopting the perspective of the Court 
for the analysis does not reflect an endorsement of the Court’s approach or 
suggest that an application to the ECtHR is the only possible avenue for estab-
lishing the responsibility of the actors involved.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the Hirsi case and 
its significance for migration control policies. Section 3 discusses current 
migration control arrangements between Italy and Libya and the facts on 
which the recent application to the Court is based. It also places the case with-
in the broader context in which the Court has to rule. Sections 4 to 6 pres-
ent different pullback scenarios, based on elements from the application and 
other reported incidents. Last, Section 7 offers some concluding thoughts.
5   See for instance Heller & Pezzani (n. 3), p. 57–82.
6   In the Hirsi case for instance the ECtHR found a violation of Articles 3 (prohibition of tor-
ture) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) ECHR as well as Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR 
(prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens).
Downloaded from Brill.com02/16/2021 09:31:21AM
via Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
399From Italian Pushbacks to Libyan Pullbacks
European Journal of Migration and Law 20 (2018) 396–426
2 ‘Old’ Migration Control Policies and the Hirsi Case
The sharp increase in the number of migrants trying to reach the EU in 2015–
2016, commonly referred to as the refugee crisis, has led to a number of policy 
developments aimed at controlling migration flows, such as Italy’s memoran-
dum of understanding with Libya and the EU-Turkey Statement.7 However, 
migration control policies are not a new phenomenon. Rather, destination 
States in Europe but also the USA and Australia have implemented policies to 
control irregular migration flows since the 1980s. Yet the nature of these poli-
cies has changed over time: some of the first measures introduced included 
visa requirements and carrier sanctions as well as pushbacks on the high seas, 
whereas more recent developments include the financing, equipping and 
training of States of origin and transit to stem migration flows.8
In the specific context of the Central Mediterranean, cooperation between 
Italy and Libya started in 2000 with an agreement for collaboration in the fight 
against terrorism, organised crime, illegal traffic of drugs, and irregular im-
migration. It was followed by various other agreements concluded between 
2003 and 2009, including a 2007 Additional Operating and Technical Protocol 
on cooperation in the fight against irregular immigration, the 2008 Treaty on 
Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation, and a 2009 Executive Protocol of 
the 2007 agreements.9 The arrangements between Italy and Libya included 
the provision of funding, equipment and other assistance as well as training 
by Italy to Libya, the return of migrants to Libya and their repatriation from 
Libya to third countries, joint patrols in the Mediterranean, and exchange of 
intelligence. In practice, between May and November 2009 Italian vessels in-
tercepted and returned over 800 persons to Libya.10
The Hirsi case concerned one such interception: 11 Somali nationals and 
13 Eritrean nationals, who were part of a group of some 200 individuals who 
7    European Council, EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016. Press Release 144/16, http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/ 
(accessed 7 August 2017).
8    On migration control policies more generally see T. Gammeltoft-Hansen & J.C. Hathaway, 
Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 53(2) Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 2015, p. 235–283; B. Frelick, I.M. Kysel & J. Podkul, The Impact of 
Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other 
Migrants, 4(4) Journal on Migration and Human Security 2016, p. 190–220; M. den Heijer, 
Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012); T. Gammeltoft-
Hansen, Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration 
Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
9    Giuffré (n. 3), p. 700–703.
10   Mussi & Tan (n. 3), p. 91–92.
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left Libya on three vessels with the aim of reaching Italy, were intercepted 
by three ships from the Italian Revenue Police and Coastguard on the high 
seas. They were transferred onto Italian military ships and returned to Tripoli, 
where they were handed over to the Libyan authorities.11
The Grand Chamber made a number of pronouncements in this case which 
are relevant for European migration control policies more broadly.12 First, the 
Court confirmed that a State exercises jurisdiction when intercepting vessels 
on the high seas. This could be read as an affirmation of its general principles 
on jurisdiction as laid down in Al-Skeini and earlier cases, according to which a 
State exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction when it exercises authority and con-
trol over a person outside its territory.13 More specifically, the Court clarified in 
Hirsi that, as the applicants were on board Italian ships with crews composed 
of Italian military personnel, they were ‘under the continuous and exclusive de 
jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities.’14
Second, Hirsi also confirmed that the assessment of a State’s human rights 
obligations is not affected by its obligations under other legal regimes, nor by 
its agreements with other States.15 Thus, a State cannot evade its responsibili-
ties under the Convention by referring to other international obligations. As 
regards regime interaction, the Court noted that ‘Italy cannot circumvent its 
“jurisdiction” under the Convention by describing the events in issue as res-
cue operations on the high seas’.16 In other words, the international obligations 
arising from other international regimes such as the law of the sea, especially 
as regards search and rescue (SAR) operations, do not displace obligations 
under the Convention. Likewise, the Court dismissed Italy’s argument that 
the applicants had been transferred to Libya in accordance with the bilateral 
11   Hirsi, paras. 9–12.
12   For a more detailed analysis of the Hirsi case see: M. Giuffré, Watered-down Rights on 
the High Seas: Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 61(3) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 2012, p. 728–750; M. den Heijer, Reflections on Refoulement and Collective 
Expulsion in the Hirsi Case, 25(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 2013, p. 265–
290; V. Moreno-Lax, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy or the Strasbourg Court versus 
Extraterritorial Migration Control?, 12(3) Human Rights Law Review 2012, p. 574–598.
13   See Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom [GC] App no 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011), 
paras. 131–39; Banković and Others v Belgium and Others [GC] App No 52207/99 (ECtHR, 
12 December 2001), paras. 59–73.
14   Hirsi, para. 81.
15   See also T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, Extraterritorial Migration Control and the Reach of 
Human Rights, in: V. Chetail & C. Bauloz (Eds), Research Handbook on International Law 
and Migration (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), p.113–131; Den Heijer (n. 12), 
p. 271–272.
16   Hirsi, para. 79.
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agreements signed by Italy and Libya. It stated explicitly that ‘Italy cannot 
evade its own responsibility by relying on its obligations arising out of bilat-
eral agreements with Libya’ and recalled that its responsibility ‘continues even 
after their having entered into treaty commitments subsequent to the entry 
into force of the Convention or its Protocols.’17
Third, in Hirsi the Court held that the prohibition of collective expulsions 
in Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR applied to interceptions on the high 
seas ‘the effect of which is to prevent migrants from reaching the borders of the 
State or even to push them back to another State’.18 The fact that the specific 
circumstances of each individual were not the subject of a detailed examina-
tion meant that this provision had been breached. In this regard, Hirsi distin-
guishes itself from the US Supreme Court’s Sale ruling, which held that the 
prohibition of refoulement did not apply to interceptions on the high seas.19 
Hirsi, on the other hand, affirms that the prohibition of refoulement also ap-
plies extraterritorially.20 In short, the Court in Hirsi clarified that States parties 
to the ECHR are prohibited from intercepting irregular migrants on the high 
seas and returning them to another State without giving them access to an 
asylum procedure and investigating whether they can be safely returned.
Last, on the merits the ECtHR found that there had been a violation of 
Article 3 ECHR on account of the fact that the applicants were exposed to the 
risk of being subjected to ill-treatment in Libya as well as the fact that they were 
exposed to the risk of being repatriated to Somalia and Eritrea (also known as 
chain refoulement). Thus, the prohibition of returns to unsafe countries applies 
to all irregular migrants and not only to refugees: ‘the Italian authorities knew 
or should have known that, as irregular migrants, they would be exposed in 
Libya to treatment in breach of the Convention’.21 Moreover, the judgment sug-
gests that States must proactively investigate whether intercepted individuals 
can be safely returned.22
However, there are also several issues which Hirsi left unaddressed. In par-
ticular, one question which the judgment left unanswered concerns Italy’s 
17   Hirsi, para. 129. See also Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom App No 61498/08 
(ECtHR, 2 March 2010), para. 128.
18   Hirsi, para 180.
19   Chris Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service et al. v Haitian 
Centers Council Inc et al, 509 US 155, United States Supreme Court 21 June 1993, p. 184.
20   The ECtHR can be seen to follow the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ inter-
pretation. See Haitian Centre for Human Rights and Others v USA Case 10.675 (IAComHR, 
13 March 1997), para 157.
21   Hirsi, para. 131. See also Den Heijer (n. 12), p. 277–78.
22   Hirsi para 133. See also Moreno-Lax (n. 12), p. 583.
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exercise of jurisdiction: although the judgment clarifies that the transfer of 
irregular migrants onto military ships on the high seas triggers Italy’s juris-
diction, it does not say whether this is also the case with other forms of in-
terception: what if the Italian vessels had forced the migrant boats to return 
to Tripoli without transferring the migrants to their own vessels? What if an 
Italian-Libyan joint patrol had carried out the interception? Furthermore, the 
Court did not address the other aspects of Italy’s cooperation with Libya under 
the Friendship Treaty and Protocols, such as the provision of funding, training, 
and equipment by Italy. This may be due to the fact that the Court was asked 
to rule on the responsibility of Italy in regard to a specific incident, rather than 
pass judgment on Italy’s cooperation with Libya more generally.23 Yet, as the 
rest of this article will show, these questions play a crucial role in today’s pull-
back practices.
3 ‘New’ Migration Control Policies and the GLAN-ASGI Case
This section discusses the current situation in the Central Mediterranean. It 
describes the migration control policies implemented by Italy after Hirsi as 
well as the specific facts of the new application, and reflects on the context in 
which the ECtHR has to rule in this case.
3.1 Migration Control in the Central Mediterranean after Hirsi
In February 2017 Italy and Libya signed a new Memorandum of Understanding 
on Cooperation on Development, Combatting Illegal Immigration, Human 
Trafficking and Smuggling, and on Strengthening Border Security.24 They 
thereby agreed to implement cooperation initiatives as foreseen in previous 
bilateral agreements, especially Article 19 of the 2008 Treaty on Friendship, 
Partnership and Cooperation, which makes provision for efforts to prevent 
clandestine immigration in the countries of origin of migratory flows.25 Italy 
further agreed to provide support and financing for development pro-
grammes in the regions affected by illegal immigration as well as technical and 
23   See also Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen’s contribution in this special issue.
24   Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Development, Combatting Illegal 
Immigration, Human Trafficking and Smuggling, and on Strengthening Border Security 
(Torino: ASGI, 2 February 2017), unofficial translation available at http://www.asgi 
.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ITALY-LIBYA-MEMORANDUM-02.02.2017.pdf (accessed 
10 August 2017). For a detailed overview of Italian cooperation with Libya, see Heller & 
Pezzani (n. 3).
25   See Hirsi, para. 20.
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technological support to the Libyan institutions in charge of the fight against 
illegal immigration, including the border and coast guard. Last, Italy finances 
the initiatives agreed on, while Italy and the EU also finance migrant hosting 
centres and Italy contributes medical supplies to these centres.26
Moreover, in summer 2017 the Italian parliament authorised a naval mis-
sion (operation Mare Sicuro) to provide technical support to the LCG.27 In 
December 2017 Italy and Libya also agreed to establish a joint operations 
room for fighting migrant smuggling and trafficking.28 At the same time, Italy 
has imposed a code of conduct on NGOs carrying out rescues in the Central 
Mediterranean and seized two NGO ships on allegations of facilitation of irreg-
ular migration.29 More recently, in summer 2018, Libya declared its SAR zone 
and Italy handed over SAR responsibility to Libya;30 Italy and Libya reactivated 
the 2008 Friendship Treaty;31 and Italy provided the LCG with more vessels and 
other equipment.32 Italy also closed its ports to rescued migrants in June 201833 
and allegedly pressured Panama into deflagging the last NGO vessel still active 
in the Central Mediterranean in September 2018.34
26   Memorandum of Understanding (n. 24). See also A. Palm, Das Memorandum of 
Understanding zwischen Italien und Libyen als Basis für einen Politikansatz, der alle 
Türen nach Europa schliessen will?, 4/17 Asyl 2017, p. 3–7.
27   Agence France Presse, Italy Impounds NGO Rescue Ship and Sends Navy Patrol Boat to 
Libya. The Guardian 21 August 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/02/
italy-impounds-ngo-rescue-ship-sends-navy-patrol-boat-to-libya-migrant-refugee-route 
-europe (accessed 21 August 2017).
28   Reuters Staff, Libya and Italy to set up Operations Room to Tackle Migrant Smuggling 
(Tripoli: Reuters, 9 December 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants 
-libya/libya-and-italy-to-set-up-operations-room-to-tackle-migrant-smuggling-idUSKBN 
1E30L8?mc_cid=6c6c760dce&mc_eid=28c3b9e46a (accessed 26 January 2018).
29   D. Howden, Europe’s New Anti-migrant Strategy? Blame the Rescuers, Prospect Magazine, 
20 March 2018, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/europes-new-anti-migrant 
-strategy-blame-the-rescuers? (accessed 19 April 2018).
30   B. Riegert, Libya takes over from Italy on Rescuing Shipwrecked Migrants, Deutsche Welle 
5 July 2018, https://p.dw.com/p/30ue2 (accessed 19 September 2018).
31   D. Bellamy, Italy promises Billions of Euros to Libya if it accepts the Return of Migrants, 
Euronews 8 July 2018, https://www.euronews.com/2018/07/08/italy-promises-billions-of-
euros-to-libya-if-it-accepts-the-return-of-migrants (accessed 19 September 2018).
32   Deutsche Welle, Italy gives Libya Ships, Equipment as more Migrants reported lost, 
Deutsche Welle 3 July 2018, https://p.dw.com/p/30i96 (accessed 19 September 2018).
33   BBC, Migrant Crisis: Italy Minister Salvini closes Ports to NGO Boats (London: BBC, 30 June 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44668062 (accessed 19 September 2018).
34   M. Weaver, Charities Plea for Help after Aquarius Migrant Rescue Ship’s Flag Revoked, 
The Guardian 24 September 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/24/italy 
-blamed-after-aquarius-migrant-rescue-ships-flag-revoked (accessed 24 September 2018).
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Furthermore, the EU is also involved in Libya through, amongst others, the 
Malta Declaration,35 EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia,36 the EU’s Border 
Assistance Mission to Libya37 (EUBAM) and the EU Emergency Trust Fund 
for Africa.38 Numerous reports suggest that the human rights situation of mi-
grants, including refugees, in Libya is extremely dire, including killings, torture, 
arbitrary detention, rape, forced labour and slavery.39 UNHCR thus ‘urges all 
States to suspend forcible returns to Libya until the security and human rights 
situation has improved considerably.’40
3.2 The GLAN-ASGI Case
It is in this context that in May 2018 the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) 
and the Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), with sup-
port from the Italian non-profit ARCI and Yale Law School’s Lowenstein 
International Human Rights Clinic, filed an application with the ECtHR on 
behalf of 17 survivors of a fatal incident in which a migrant boat found it-
self in distress off the coast of Libya on 6 November 2017. According to the 
35   European Council, Malta Declaration by the Members of the European Council on the 
External Aspects of Migration: Addressing the Central Mediterranean Route, Press Release 
43/17 (Brussels: European Council, 3 February 2017), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2017/01/03-malta-declaration/ (accessed 10 August 2017), para. 6(i).
36   Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/993 of 20 June 2016 
Amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union Military Operation in the 
Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA), Article 1.
37   Council of the European Union, EUBAM Libya: Mission Extended, Budget Approved, Press 
Release 482/16, (Luxembourg: Council of the European Union, 4 August 2016), http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/08/04-eubam-libya-mission 
-extended/ (accessed 20 September 2017).
38   European Commission, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Libya (Brussels: Euro-
pean Commission), https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya_en 
(accessed 3 May 2018).
39   See for instance Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses against 
Europe-Bound Refugees and Migrants (London: Amnesty International, 2017), https://
www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1975612017ENGLISH.PDF (accessed 3 May 
2018); Refugees International, ‘Hell on Earth’: Abuses Against Refugees and Migrants 
Trying to Reach Europe from Libya (Washington: Refugees International, 2017), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/592f37468419c2ac554b
4c9f/1496266580341/2017.6.1+Libya.pdf (accessed 10 August 2017); Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Chief: Suffering of Migrants in Libya 
Outrage to Conscience of Humanity (Geneva: UNHCR, 14 November 2017), http://www 
.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22393&LangID=E (accessed 
29 November 2017).
40   UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Position on Returns to Libya—
Update II (Geneva: UNHCR, September 2018), http://www.refworld.org/docid/5b8d02314 
.html (accessed 17 September 2018).
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application, at least 20 migrants died when the LCG interfered with the efforts 
of the NGO vessel Sea Watch to rescue 130 migrants from a sinking dinghy.41
The application is based on a reconstruction of the incident of 6 November 
2017. According to this reconstruction, the passengers of a migrant boat made 
a distress call to the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC), 
which instructed both the NGO vessel Sea Watch and the LCG’s patrol vessel 
Ras Jadir to direct themselves towards the boat in distress. This latter vessel 
had been donated by Italy to Libya in May 2017 and eight out of the 13 crew on 
board had received training by EUNAVFOR MED. Several European vessels and 
aircraft were nearby, including an Italian navy helicopter.42
While it is unclear whether the MRCC designated the Libyan vessel as on 
scene coordinator and did not inform the NGO vessel or whether the LCG 
assumed on scene coordination of its own accord, it is alleged that no clear 
instructions were given and that the NGO ship and LCG could not come to 
a mutual agreement. It is further alleged that the LCG vessel did not imme-
diately assist the migrants in distress, used a dangerous manoeuvre that en-
dangered the lives of the migrants, and hindered the NGO’s rescue operation 
by throwing objects at the NGO’s inflatable boats. The passengers on board 
the Libyan vessel were cordoned off and beaten. One passenger was hanging 
on the ladder outside the ship when the LCG left; the LCG slowed down and 
pulled the person on board after the Italian helicopter repeatedly radioed it to 
stop. According to testimony, the survivors who were brought back to Libya en-
dured detention in inhumane conditions, beatings, extortion, starvation, rape, 
slavery and torture.43
The incident of 6 November 2017, like the other incidents discussed in the 
next sections, took place between 20 and 24 nautical miles off the Libyan 
coast44 and are therefore outside Libyan territorial waters. Moreover, as seen 
in Section 2, the ECtHR held in Hirsi that Italy’s obligations under the ECHR 
are not affected by other legal regimes, including the recent establishment of 
a Libyan SAR zone.
This case presents many similarities with Hirsi. Both applications focus on a 
specific incident in which migrants are intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea 
and returned to Libya. In both cases, the interception takes place in the context 
41   Global Legal Action Network (n. 4).
42   The analysis only addresses the responsibility of Italy, although it is acknowledged that 
other EU Member States were indirectly involved in this incident through the presence 
of vessels or aircraft flying their flag and the fact that eight out of the 13 crew members 
present on board the LCG vessel had been trained by EUNAVFOR MED.
43   Heller & Pezzani (n. 3), p. 87–99.
44   Ibid., p. 59, 68 and 88.
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of a bilateral agreement between Italy and Libya aimed at preventing migrant 
arrivals in Italy and which also includes other forms of cooperation. Moreover, 
both in 2017 and in 2009 returned migrants risk suffering severe human rights 
violations in Libya and being repatriated to their country of origin.
However, unlike Hirsi, in the GLAN-ASGI case the migrants are intercepted 
by a Libyan rather than an Italian vessel, and Italy’s involvement seems to be 
limited to partly coordinating the intervention through the MRCC, having do-
nated the LCG’s vessel, and the presence of an Italian navy helicopter nearby. 
Moreover, the EU’s involvement is more substantial under current migration 
control policies than at the time of the Hirsi case. Insofar as the case has been 
brought only against Italy, the EU’s greater involvement may make it more 
difficult to argue that Italy is responsible. These differences between the two 
cases are worth exploring in more depth. Before turning to the legal analysis, 
however, it is worth reflecting on the broader context in which the GLAN-ASGI 
case is brought to the Court, as it may influence how the Court chooses to ad-
dress this case.45
3.3 The Broader Context
The Hirsi case was decided in 2012, almost three years after the pushbacks had 
taken place and a year after Italy had suspended its cooperation with Libya. 
It remains to be seen whether the current pullback practices will still be in 
place when the Court rules on the new case but, if this were the case, the im-
pact of this judgment could be as significant as Hirsi. If the Court invalidates 
the pullback practices, this would require Italy to revise its migration control 
policies in the Central Mediterranean. In that sense, the judgment could be 
compared to MSS v Belgium and Greece46 which led to a suspension of trans-
fers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation. However, a decision that does not 
condemn these practices could be interpreted by Italy and the EU as legitimis-
ing the pullback policies. As will be seen below, this could be the case if the 
application is declared inadmissible because Italy lacked jurisdiction.
45   See also Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen’s contribution in this special issue; M. Baumgärtel, 
‘Part of the Game’: Government Strategies against European Litigation Concerning Migrant 
Rights, in: T. Aalberts & T. Gammeltoft-Hansen (Eds), The Changing Practices of Inter-
national Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 103–128; M. Baumgärtel, 
High Risk, High Reward: Taking the Question of Italy’s Involvement in Libyan ‘Pullback’ 
Policies to the European Court of Human Rights, EJIL: talk! 14 May 2018, https://www 
.ejiltalk.org/high-risk-high-reward-taking-the-question-of-italys-involvement-in-libyan 
-pullback-policies-to-the-european-court-of-human-rights/ (accessed 25 May 2018).
46   MSS v Belgium and Greece [GC] App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011).
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The Court may also be careful in thinking about the scope of its judgment 
in terms of its impact on pullback policies. Indeed, the current practices can 
be seen as circumventing the Hirsi judgment, whereby Italy hopes to obtain 
the same result of reducing migration flows as through pushbacks but without 
incurring any responsibility.47 If the Court addresses only the specific facts of 
the case, thereby condemning one particular aspect of the pullback policies 
without making any pronouncements on their legitimacy more generally, it 
may indirectly push Italy to reinforce other forms of cooperation with Libya.
Furthermore, in Hirsi the Court already acknowledged ‘the difficulties re-
lated to the phenomenon of migration by sea, involving additional compli-
cations for States in controlling the borders in southern Europe.’48 Yet Hirsi 
was decided before the refugee crisis of 2015–2016, which led to stronger 
anti-immigration discourses in Europe and a determination on the part of 
policy makers to stop, or at least reduce, irregular migration flows at all costs. 
Moreover, the ECtHR faces a number of other challenges, such as calls from 
States parties to withdraw from the ECHR and Council of Europe Member 
States reducing or stopping their financial contributions.49 The ECtHR may 
take into account this difficult political context and adopt a cautious approach 
when deciding on such a politically challenging case, although it has not shied 
away from controversial decisions in the past.
Indeed, the ECtHR’s recent decision in ND and NT v Spain suggests that it 
may be willing to take a strong stance on migration control despite widespread 
European support for such policies. The Third Section of the Court found that 
pushback practices at the border between Morocco and the Spanish enclaves 
of Ceuta and Melilla amounted to collective expulsions in breach of Article 4 
47   I. Mann, Dialectic of Transnationalism: Unauthorized Migration and Human Rights, 
1993–2013, 54(2) Harvard International Law Journal 2013, p. 315–391. See also N. Frei 
& C. Hruschka, Zur Umgehung des Refoulement-Verbots beim Kampf gegen ‘ille-
gale Migration’: Eine rechtliche Bewertung der Massnahmen der EU an der zentralen 
Mittelmeerroute. Asyl 4/2017, p. 8–14; T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, International Refugee Law 
and Refugee Policy: The Case of Deterrence Policies, 27(4) Journal of Refugee Studies 
2014, p. 574–595.
48   Hirsi, para. 122.
49   See for instance W. Worley, Theresa May ‘Will Campaign to Leave the European 
Convention on Human Rights in 2020 Election’, The Independent 29 December 2016, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-campaign-leave-european 
-convention-on-human-rights-2020-general-election-brexit-a7499951.html (accessed 1 June 
2018); J. Rankin, Human Rights Body faces Cash Crisis after Clash with Russia, The 
Guardian 16 March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2018/mar/16/human-rights 
-body-faces-cash-crisis-after-clash-with-russia (accessed 1 June 2018).
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of Protocol No. 4.50 The case is now pending before the Grand Chamber, and 
the Grand Chamber’s judgment in this case may provide an indication as to 
how strong a stance the ECtHR is willing to take on migration control prac-
tices. However, the facts in ND and NT seem more straightforward than in the 
GLAN-ASGI case, as the Court had already established in Hirsi that pushbacks 
were prohibited under the ECHR.51
It is also worth comparing the ECtHR’s approach to two recent decisions of 
the Court of Justice of the EU. In X and X v Belgium the Court of Justice ruled 
that EU law did not apply to humanitarian visas,52 while in NF the General 
Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the EU-Turkey deal.53 
These rulings can be interpreted as a choice by the Court of Justice not to in-
tervene in migration control policies.54 While the Court of Justice seems un-
willing to condemn current migration control policies, the ECtHR as a human 
rights court may be in a better position to do so. In any event, the Court has 
to consider the broader political context when ruling on the GLAN-ASGI case.
4 First Scenario: Italian Assets are Present on Scene
As noted in Section 3.2, an Italian helicopter was present on scene during the 
incident of 6 November. Yet it has also been reported that during an earlier 
incident on 27 September 2017 an Italian warship notified the LCG of two mi-
grant boats in distress 20 nautical miles off the Libyan coast. The LCG rescued 
the migrants and returned them to Libya. The Italian warship did not rescue 
the migrants but provided life vests to them.55 It is not clear if the Italian ship 
also prevented the migrant boats from continuing their journey.56 It also seems 
50   ND and NT v Spain Apps nos 8675/15 and 8697/15 (ECtHR, 3 October 2017).
51   See A. Pijnenburg, Is ND and NT v Spain the new Hirsi?, EJIL: Talk! 17 October 2017, https://
www.ejiltalk.org/is-n-d-and-n-t-v-spain-the-new-hirsi/ (accessed 19 January 2018).
52   Case C-638/16 X and X v Belgium, 7 March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:173.
53   Case T-192/16 NF v European Council, 28 February 2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:128. In September 
2018 the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal against the General Court’s order as mani-
festly inadmissible. Joined Cases C-208/17 P to C-210/17 P NF and Others v European 
Council, 12 September 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:705.
54   See for instance T. Spijkerboer, Bifurcation of Mobility, Bifurcation of Law: Externalization 
of Migration Policy before the EU Court of Justice, Journal of Refugee Studies (forthcom-
ing), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3053891 (accessed 1 June 2018).
55   Heller & Pezzani (n. 3), p. 68–69. See also Vice News, Italy is Paying Libya to Intercept 
Migrants on the Mediterranean, VICE News 25 October 2017, https://news.vice.com/
en_us/article/ned4dg/italy-is-paying-libya-to-intercept-migrants-on-the-mediterranean 
(accessed 26 January 2018).
56   This is suggested by Biondi: P. Biondi, Italy Strikes Back Again: A Push-back’s 
Firsthand Account, Border Criminologies, 15 December 2017, https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/
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that several merchant and NGO vessels who were in the area and could have 
been diverted to rescue the migrants were not informed.57 Both incidents thus 
have in common that Italian assets were present on scene.
4.1 Authority and Control over Persons
One key issue which the Court has to address in both situations is whether 
Italy exercised jurisdiction over the intercepted migrants.58 As discussed in 
Section 1, it found in Hirsi that Italy exercised both de jure and de facto control 
over the migrants by transferring them to Italian ships. In the incidents dis-
cussed here, however, it seems that the Italian ship or helicopter did not make 
physical contact with the migrants or their boat. This presents the Court with 
a new challenge, as it has not yet been faced with such a situation.
As regards the incident of 27 September 2017 involving the Italian warship, 
the Court could refer to various earlier cases involving respondent States’ ves-
sels. Thus, in Medvedyev the Grand Chamber held that intercepting a boat 
on the high seas without embarking the people on board but exercising de 
facto ‘full and exclusive control’ over the boat and those on board qualifies as 
exercising jurisdiction.59 It further specified in Al-Skeini that what was decisive 
for jurisdiction triggered by State agent authority and control was ‘the exercise 
of physical power and control over the person in question’60 and referred to 
the test of full and exclusive control over a ship in Hirsi.61 Following this read-
ing of its case-law, it is unlikely that the Court would find that the Italian ship 
exercised sufficient authority and control over the applicants to trigger Italy’s 
jurisdiction.
However, it could also choose to refer to other cases which may enable it 
to adopt a lower threshold in this case. In particular, in Xhavara, which con-
cerned the fatal ramming of an Albanian migrant ship by an Italian military 
 
research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2017/12/
italy-strikes (accessed 26 January 2018).
57   Heller & Pezzani (n. 3), p. 68–69.
58   On extraterritorial jurisdiction see for instance M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application 
of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011); M. Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009); T. de Boer, Closing 
Legal Black Holes: The Role of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Refugee Rights Protection, 
28(1) Journal of Refugee Studies 2014, p. 118–134; M. Duttwiler, Authority, Control and 
Jurisdiction in the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 30(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2012, p. 137–162.
59   Medvedyev and Others v France [GC] App no 3394/03 (ECtHR, 29 March 2010), para. 67.
60   Al-Skeini, para. 136.
61   Hirsi, para. 73.
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vessel in the context of a bilateral agreement between Italy and Albania, the 
Court did not explicitly address the question of jurisdiction. Although it even-
tually found the complaint inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic rem-
edies, the decision suggests that both Italy and Albania exercised jurisdiction.62 
Likewise, in Women on Waves Portugal forbade an NGO vessel from entering its 
territorial waters and placed a military ship close to the NGO vessel to prevent 
it from doing so.63 In this case also, the ECtHR seemed to assume that Portugal 
exercised jurisdiction. Thus, one could reason that ramming a boat or prevent-
ing it from moving forward through the presence of a military vessel triggers 
jurisdiction because it amounts to ‘full and exclusive control’. Alternatively, 
Xhavara and Women on Waves could be read as applying a lower threshold for 
jurisdiction. Arguably, under the same reasoning, throwing life vests from a 
nearby vessel could qualify as an exercise of authority and control and hence 
trigger jurisdiction.
Moreover, Den Heijer notes that some ECtHR cases could be interpreted 
as recognising that States have positive obligations towards individuals out-
side their territory and over whom they do not exercise control, although the 
case-law is ‘scant and hardly accompanied by a well-elaborated doctrine’.64 
Following this approach, the Court could find that Italy did not comply with 
its positive obligations on two grounds. First, because the Italian ship did not 
rescue the migrants itself and, second, because it contacted only the LCG and 
not a nearby merchant or NGO vessel to do so, as a result of which the migrants 
were brought to Libya instead of Italy.
Turning to the facts of the GLAN-ASGI application, in which an Italian army 
helicopter rather than a vessel was present on scene, what does the foregoing 
tell us about Italy’s exercise of jurisdiction? It seems unlikely that the pres-
ence of an Italian helicopter would amount to ‘full and exclusive control’ as in 
Medvedyev and Hirsi, and, as this incident concerns a helicopter rather than 
a ship, the cases of Xhavara and Women on Waves are less relevant. Although 
this situation may come closer to cases involving persons being killed abroad 
from an airplane or helicopter, the ECtHR’s case-law is arguably too scarce 
and inconclusive to provide a clear answer. Thus, while in its (in)famous 
Banković decision the Court held that aerial bombings abroad did not trigger 
the respondent States’ jurisdiction,65 in Pad it later found that Iranian men 
62   Xhavara and Others v Italy and Albania App no 39473/98 (ECtHR, 11 January 2001), pp. 5–6.
63   Women on Waves v Portugal App No 31276/05 (ECtHR, 3 February 2009).
64   Den Heijer (n. 8), p. 48. See for instance Treska v Albania and Italuy [Admissibility] App 
no 26937/04 (ECtHR, 29 June 2006); Manoilescu and Dobrescu v Romania and Russia App 
no 60861/00 (ECtHR, 3 March 2005).
65   Banković, para. 82.
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who were killed by shooting from a Turkish military helicopter in the border 
area came within Turkey’s jurisdiction.66 Yet to what extent the mere pres-
ence of a helicopter, without shooting or bombing, triggers Italy’s jurisdiction, 
remains unclear.
However, the Court could also choose to look at the various ways in which 
Italy exercised influence over the situation and examine whether that amounts 
to sufficient authority and control over the applicants. It could thereby take 
into consideration the fact that the Libyan vessel had been donated by Italy, 
that the MRCC and Italian helicopter gave instructions to the LCG, and that 
Italy had contributed to training by EUNAVFOR MED. If it applies a lower 
threshold than ‘full and exclusive control’, it might find that Italy exercised 
authority and control over the intercepted migrants—and hence jurisdiction. 
Moreover, it could take into account Italy’s positive obligations and rule that 
Italy did not comply with its positive obligations because it failed to prevent 
the applicants from being returned to Libya.
In sum, referring to ‘outlier cases’ and to Italy’s positive obligations could 
lead the Court to find that Italy is responsible for exposing the migrants to 
a risk of ill-treatment in Libya. This approach would signify a move from its 
stricter case-law, which suggests that Italy must exercise full and exclusive con-
trol over the migrants, towards adopting a lower threshold to trigger extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction.
4.2 Public Powers
Alternatively, the ECtHR could draw on another strand of case-law in order to 
establish that Italy exercises jurisdiction. Indeed, it held in Al-Skeini that a State 
exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction when, through the consent, invitation or 
acquiescence of another State, it exercises ‘all or some of the public powers 
normally to be exercised by that Government’.67 Thus, a State is responsible 
for human rights violations abroad when its authorities carry out executive or 
judicial functions on the territory of another State ‘in accordance with custom, 
treaty or other agreement’ and ‘as long as the acts in question are attribut-
able to it rather than to the territorial State’.68 However, this line of case-law is 
not well-developed.69 While in Al-Skeini the Court developed and applied this 
66   Pad and Others v Turkey [Admissibility] App no 60167/00 (ECtHR, 28 June 2007), para. 54.
67   Al-Skeini, para. 135.
68   Ibid.
69   Cases in which the Court seems to have applied this approach include X and Y v 
Switzerland Apps nos 7289/75 and 7349/76 (EComHR, 17 July 1977); Drozd and Janousek v 
France and Spain App no 12747/87 (ECtHR, 26 June 1992); Gentilhomme, Schaff-Benhadji 
and Zerouki v France Apps nos 48205/99, 48207/99 and 48209/99 (ECtHR, 14 May 2002); 
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approach in the context of the British military presence in Iraq after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein, Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway have suggested that it 
may also apply to migration control policies.70
As regards the incidents of 27 September and 6 November 2017, the Court 
could thus find that rescuing migrants in distress off the Libyan coast is a pub-
lic power normally to be exercised by Libya. However, as the interceptions took 
place outside Libyan territorial waters, it cannot be said to have taken place 
on Libyan territory.71 The Court could further establish that they took place in 
accordance with an agreement, namely the memorandum of understanding 
between Italy and Libya, and possibly also with SAR obligations in the law of 
the sea.
Could it also hold that the act in question, namely the interception, is at-
tributable to Italy rather than to Libya? In order to answer this question the 
Court could refer to the rules on the attribution of conduct laid down in the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). Article 6 ARSIWA holds: ‘The conduct 
of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall be consid-
ered an act of the former State under international law if the organ is acting in 
the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose 
disposal it is placed.’72 This suggests that the conduct of the LCG could be at-
tributed to Italy rather than to Libya if it is established that the LCG exercises 
elements of the governmental authority of Italy. Whether this is the case, and 
whether the conduct of the LCG is attributable to Italy rather than to Libya, 
depends on the specific facts of the case. Whereas the applicants could argue 
that Libya is in fact carrying out border controls on behalf of Italy, Italy could 
for instance point to the fact that the LCG is flying the Libyan rather than the 
Italian flag.
Alternatively, the Court could consider applying a lower attribution stan-
dard than Article 6 ARSIWA. Indeed, in some cases the ECtHR seems to have 
used a lower standard to attribute conduct to the respondent State, namely 
that of complicity.73 In various extraordinary rendition cases the Court thus 
Jaloud v the Netherlands [GC] App no 47708/08 (ECtHR, 20 November 2014), paras. 14–53; 
and Pisari v Moldova and Russia App no 42139/12 (ECtHR, 21 April 2015), para. 33.
70   Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway (n. 8), p. 266–269.
71   At the time of this incident Libya had not yet declared its SAR zone.
72   International Law Commission, 2001, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the ILC on the Work of its 53rd Session, UN Doc. 
A/56/10.
73   M. Jackson, Complicity in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 194; 
V. Lanovoy, Complicity and its Limits in the Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2017), p. 326.
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attributes the conduct of the United States to European States: ‘the respon-
dent State must be regarded as responsible under the Convention for acts 
performed by foreign officials on its territory with the acquiescence or con-
nivance of its authorities’.74 Moreover, the respondent States are also held re-
sponsible for the applicants’ transfer abroad, where they were exposed to a 
‘foreseeable serious risk of further ill-treatment and conditions of detention in 
breach of Article 3’.75 However, in those cases the applicants had been on the 
territory (and hence within the jurisdiction) of the respondent State. So far the 
Court has not applied this approach in cases where the applicant is not on 
the territory of the respondent State, nor in the context of the exercise of public 
powers. In sum, although an argument could be made under this approach, the 
requirement that the interception be attributable to Italy rather than to Libya 
could prove an obstacle to finding that Italy exercised jurisdiction through its 
exercise of public powers. It arguably remains uncertain whether the Court 
would apply this approach in this case.
In any event, if the Court were to find that Italy did not exercise jurisdic-
tion, it would declare the application inadmissible. On the other hand, if it 
rules that the case is admissible because Italy exercised jurisdiction, it would 
resemble Hirsi insofar as the Court could examine on the merits whether Italy 
breached its obligations under Article 3 ECHR by exposing the applicants to a 
risk of ill-treatment in Libya. In addition, it could also examine whether Italy 
was responsible for ill-treatment that amounted to inhuman and degrading 
treatment when the passengers were on board the Libyan ship. Last, it could 
examine, as it did in Hirsi, whether there was a risk of chain refoulement from 
Libya to the applicants’ countries of origin.76
5 Second Scenario: Italy Supports the Libyan Coast Guard
In addition to the presence of an Italian helicopter on 6 November 2017, Italy 
was also involved in the interception in other ways, insofar as the Libyan vessel 
74   El-Masri v the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia App no 39630/09 (ECtHR, 
13 December 2012), para. 206; see also Al Nashiri v Poland App no 28761/11 (ECtHR, 24 July 
2014), para. 452; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland App no 7511/13 (ECtHR, 24 July 2014), 
para. 449; Nasr and Ghali v Italy App no 44883/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2016), para. 241; 
Al Nashiri v Romania App no 33234/12 (ECtHR, 31 may 2018), para. 594; Abu Zubaydah v 
Lithuania App no 46454/11 (ECtHR, 31 May 2018), para. 581.
75   Al Nashiri v Poland, para. 518; see also Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, para. 513; Abu 
Zubaydah v Lithuania, para. 643; Al Nashiri v Romania, para. 678.
76   Moreover, the Court could also examine, as it did in Hirsi, whether there has been a 
breach of the prohibition of collective expulsions under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the 
ECHR.
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had been donated by Italy and the majority of its crew had been trained by 
EUNAVFOR MED. More generally, UNHCR reports that just under 14,500 per-
sons were rescued by the LCG in 2017.77 It therefore seems reasonable to 
assume that in a number of cases the LCG intercepted migrants without any 
direct Italian intervention. In those cases Italy’s involvement is limited to the 
fact that it indirectly supports the LCG.
This support consists of the donation of patrol boats to the LCG78 and an 
Italian naval mission which is to provide technical and logistical support and 
advice to the Libyan coast guard, reconnaissance capabilities, and support to 
set up a centre for coordinating operations.79 It is also alleged that the Italian 
military presence in Tripoli served as a communication and coordination 
centre which made a crucial contribution to the LCG’s command and control 
capabilities.80 Italy further contributes to the training of the LCG by the EU’s 
EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, and provides funding for the maintenance 
of Libyan boats and the training of Libyan crews.81 This raises the question: 
how could the Court address these indirect forms of Italian involvement?
5.1 Responsibility Link
Given the various forms of Italian support, ranging from funding and equip-
ping to training and coordinating, the Libyan pullbacks show some simi-
larities with the Court’s case-law concerning human rights violations in 
Transdniestria, which may enable the Court to draw on this strand of case-law. 
Indeed, in Ilaşcu the ECtHR held that the Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria 
was set up with Russia’s support and remained ‘under the effective authority, 
or at the very least under the decisive influence, of the Russian Federation, and 
in any event that it survives by virtue of the military, economic, financial and 
political support given to it by the Russian Federation.82 Accordingly, the Court 
found that there was ‘a continuous and uninterrupted link of responsibility on 
the part of the Russian Federation for the applicants’ fate’ and the applicants 
77   UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Desperate Journeys (Geneva: UNHCR, February 
2017), http://www.refworld.org/docid/58b58b184.html (accessed 17 April 2018), p. 13.
78   A. Lewis & S. Scherer, Italy tries to Bolster Libyan Coast Guard, despite Humanitarian 
Concern (Tripoli/Aquarius Rescue ship: Reuters, 15 May 2017, https://uk.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/uk-europe-migrants-libya/italy-tries-to-bolster-libyan-coast-guard-despite-humani-
tarian-concern-idUKKCN18B2EN (accessed 24 May 2018).
79   Amnesty International (n. 39), p. 46.
80   Heller & Pezzani (n. 4), p. 49.
81   Amnesty International (n. 39), p. 46.
82   Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia [GC] App no 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004), 
para. 392.
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therefore came within the jurisdiction of Russia.83 This arguably suggests that 
support may trigger jurisdiction even if the human rights violation itself is 
committed by another actor.84 The Court has followed this line of reasoning in 
later Transdniestria cases.85
The Court could consider adapting this line of case-law, which concerns 
a self-proclaimed republic, to the LCG, a State organ. It could thus examine 
whether Italy’s support amounts to effective authority or decisive influence 
and whether the LCG survives by virtue of the support provided by Italy. Should 
it find that there is a continuous and uninterrupted link of responsibility and 
that Italy therefore exercises jurisdiction, it could rule, as it did in Hirsi, that 
returning migrants to Libya breaches Italy’s obligations under Article 3 ECHR. 
In a similar vein, Moreno-Lax and Giuffré suggest that the funding, training 
and equipping of Libya by EU Member States can be said to constitute a form 
of ‘decisive influence’, which amounts to jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR.86
5.2 Aid or Assistance
Yet the Court could also explore another route by drawing on the provisions of 
the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which are commonly accepted 
as ‘an authoritative formulation of international law relating to international 
responsibility’.87 In particular, Article 16 ARSIWA holds that:
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an in-
ternationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for 
doing so if:
83   Ilaşcu, paras. 393–394.
84   H.P. Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), at p. 412.
85   See Ivanţoc and Others v Moldova and Russia App no 23687/05 (ECtHR, 15 November 2011); 
Catan and Others v Moldova and Russia [GC] Apps nos 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06 
(ECtHR, 19 October 2012); Mozer v Moldova and Russia [GC] App no 11138/10 (ECtHR, 
23 February 2016); Turturica and Casian v Moldova and Russia Apps nos 28648/06 and 
18832/07 (ECtHR, 30 August 2016).
86   V. Moreno-Lax & M. Giuffré, The Rise of Consensual Containment: From “Contactless 
Control” to “Contactless Responsibility” for Forced Migration Flows, in: S. Juss (Ed.), 
Research Handbook on International Refugee Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, forthcom-
ing), p. 23–24, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3009331 (accessed 1 June 2018).
87   A. Nollkaemper, Introduction, in: A. Nollkaemper & I. Plakokefalos (Eds), Principles of 
Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art, Shared 
Responsibility in International Law Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), p. 1–24, at p. 3.
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a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the inter-
nationally wrongful act; and
b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State.
In other words, if the requirements of Article 16 are met, Italy would incur de-
rived responsibility on account of the aid and assistance it provides to Libya in 
committing an internationally wrongful act.
If the Court applies Article 16 ARSIWA, it would have to examine whether the 
requirements of this provision are met, which it has not done before. Although 
Article 16 ARSIWA has been referred to in extraordinary rendition cases88 and 
in a separate opinion in Hirsi,89 the Court has never applied this provision 
in practice, preferring to incorporate complicity scenarios into the primary 
human rights norms embodied in the ECHR.90 Thus, expulsion amounts to a 
violation of Article 3 if there is a real risk of exposure to ill-treatment, regard-
less whether it actually materialises. Therefore, under Article 3 ECHR, unlike 
under Article 16 ARSIWA, ‘the establishment of the expelling state’s respon-
sibility is not contingent upon the receiving state committing a wrongful act, 
but follows directly from the state violating a protective duty in respect of an 
individual situated in its territory.’91 The prohibition of refoulement can thus be 
seen to function as an alternative to Article 16 ARSIWA.
However, the fact that jurisdiction may be a serious obstacle in the context 
of the Libyan pullbacks could provide an incentive for the Court to engage 
more fully with Article 16 ARSIWA in this case. Indeed, whereas Article 3 ECHR 
only applies when Italy exercises jurisdiction, Article 16 ARSIWA also applies 
when it does not. Various scholars have also argued that Article 16 applies to 
Italy’s support for the LCG.92
Although there seems to be general acceptance that Article 16 ARSIWA is 
part of customary international law, as recognised by the International Court 
88   See El-Masri, para 97; Al Nashiri v Poland, para 207; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, 
para 201; Nasr and Ghali, para 185; Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania, para. 232; Al Nashiri v 
Romania, para. 210.
89   Hirsi, Concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, p. 77.
90   M. den Heijer, Shared Responsibility Before the European Court of Human Rights, 60(3) 
Netherlands International Law Review 2013, p. 411–440, at p. 422.
91   Ibid.
92   A. Hirsch & A. Dastyari, The Ring of Steel: Extraterritorial Migration Controls in Indonesia 
and Libya and the Complicity of Australia and Italy, Human Rights Law Review (forthcom-
ing). See also Moreno-Lax & Giuffré (forthcoming) (n. 86).
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of Justice,93 its exact contours remain unclear.94 There is a lack of jurispru-
dence and extensive debate among scholars regarding its interpretation.95 
Accordingly, the ECtHR would have to interpret the requirements of this pro-
vision and decide if they are met in this specific case.
Thus, it would first have to determine what constitutes the internationally 
wrongful act committed by Libya. Article 2 ARSIWA defines an internationally 
wrongful act of a State as an action or omission which is attributable to the 
state under international law and constitutes a breach of an international ob-
ligation of the State. As regards the events of the GLAN-ASGI case or similar 
incidents, it could be argued—depending on the exact circumstances of the 
case—that the ill-treatment of the migrants by the LCG reaches the threshold 
of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
It could further be argued that returning the migrants to Libya also breaches 
Article 7 ICCPR as it exposes them to a risk of ill-treatment.96 Last, depend-
ing on the exact circumstances of the case, it could be argued that the actual 
ill-treatment of migrants in Libya breaches Article 7 ICCPR, Article 1 of the 
Convention against Torture (CAT) or the jus cogens prohibition of torture.97
Second, the Court would have to assess whether the support provided by 
Italy to the LCG qualifies as aid or assistance. It is likely that activities such 
as funding, training, equipping and coordinating qualify as aid or assistance.98 
However, the fact that some of this support is provided by the EU may make 
it more difficult to find that Italy’s support alone qualifies as aid or assistance, 
93   International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 
ICJ Report (The Hague: ICJ, 2007), p. 43, para. 420.
94   Aust (n. 84), p. 99–100.
95   On the interpretation of Article 16 ARSIWA see for instance J. Crawford, State Responsibility: 
The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Aust (n. 84); Jackson 
(n. 73); Lanovoy (n. 73).
96   It would be more difficult to argue that pullbacks by Libya on the high seas breach the 
prohibition of refoulement in Article 3 CAT because, although the migrants have left 
Libyan territory (the interception took place outside Libya’s territorial waters), they are 
not being returned to another State, as required by Article 3 CAT. It could possibly be 
argued that pullbacks by Libya breach the customary prohibition of refoulement but this 
would require establishing that non-refoulement is a customary norm of international law, 
that Libya is not a persistent objector, and that it also applies to pullbacks (as opposed to 
pushbacks). Looking beyond Article 3 ECHR, the Court could also examine whether there 
has been a violation of the right to leave (Article 2(2) of Protocol No. 4) and the prohibi-
tion of collective expulsions (Article 4 of Protocol No. 4).
97   Libya has ratified the ICCPR and CAT but not the Refugee Convention.
98   See Crawford (n. 96), p. 402; Jackson (n. 74), p. 153–155; Aust (n. 85), p. 209–210.
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although the fact that Italy shares responsibility with the EU does not preclude 
Italy’s responsibility.99
Third, the Court would have to rule on the closeness of the link between the 
support provided and the human rights violation. Indeed, although Article 16 
does not specify that the causal link (nexus) between the aid or assistance 
provided and the principal wrongful act must reach a certain level of close-
ness, the Commentary specifies that ‘[t]here is no requirement that the aid 
or assistance should have been essential to the performance of the interna-
tionally wrongful act; it is sufficient if it contributed significantly to that act.’100 
Commentators disagree regarding what threshold is required,101 with Lanovoy 
arguing that there is no clear standard yet.102 Nevertheless, how the Court de-
fines the violation committed by Libya matters. Indeed, it seems likelier that 
the Court would find that Italy’s support contributed to exposing the migrants 
to a risk of ill-treatment by returning them to Libya than to their actual ill-
treatment in Libya.
Fourth, Article 16(a) ARSIWA requires that Italy had ‘knowledge of the cir-
cumstances of the internationally wrongful act’. However, according to the 
Commentary, ‘the aid or assistance must be given with a view to facilitating the 
commission of the wrongful act, and must actually do so.’103 In other words, 
a key question is whether Article 16 ARSIWA requires knowledge or intent on 
the part of the aiding or assisting State. What standard is applied, in combina-
tion with what counts as an internationally wrongful act, may lead to different 
outcomes.
Thus, if the standard is knowledge, it may be sufficient for the Court to find 
that Italy knew about the ill-treatment of migrants at the hands of the LCG, 
that they would be returned, or that they would be ill-treated. As there have 
been numerous reports of severe human rights violations suffered by migrants 
in Libya104 as well as indications that the Italian government knew about this,105 
99   See Den Heijer (n. 91).
100   International Law Commission (n. 73), p. 66, para. 5.
101   Compare for example Aust (n. 85), p. 420; Jackson (n. 74), pp. 156–157; Crawford (n. 96), 
p. 402.
102   Lanovoy (n. 73), p. 184.
103   International Law Commission (n. 73), p. 66, para. 5.
104   See n. 39.
105   See for instance M. Menduni, Giro: ‘Fare rientrare quelle persone vuol dire condan-
narle all’inferno’, La Stampa 6 August 2017, http://www.lastampa.it/2017/08/06/italia/ 
cronache/giro-fare-rientrare-quelle-persone-vuol-dire-condannarle-allinferno-SXnGzVl 
zftFl7fNGFCMADN/pagina.html (accessed 1 June 2018); V. Passalacqua, The ‘Open Arms’ 
Case: Reconciling the Notion of ‘Place of Safety’ with the Human Rights of Migrants, 
EJIL: Talk! 21 May 2018, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-open-arms-case-reconciling-the 
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this requirement should not be problematic for the Court. As there have also 
been reports regarding the abusive behaviour of the LCG, the applicants may 
also be able to prove that Italy knew of the circumstances of the interceptions 
themselves.106
However, if the standard is intent, the applicants would have to show that 
Italy intended the alleged human rights violations to take place. This would be 
more difficult as regards the ill-treatment itself, since Italy has also taken mea-
sures aimed at improving the situation of migrants in Libya and the EUNAVFOR 
MED training ‘includes a substantial focus on human rights and international 
law’.107 Some commentators have suggested that the standard may lie between 
knowledge and intent, approximating knowledge or virtual certainty that the 
assisted State will use the assistance unlawfully.108 Under this threshold, the 
ECtHR could find that Italy knew or had virtual certainty that Libya would use 
its support for returning migrants to Libya (and hence exposing them to a risk 
of ill-treatment).
Last, Article 16(b) also requires that the human rights violation would be 
internationally wrongful if committed by Italy. Here also, how this require-
ment is interpreted, in combination with what counts as Libya’s internation-
ally wrongful act, may lead to different outcomes. A key question is whether 
Italy and Libya must be bound by norms that have the same source, or wheth-
er it is sufficient for them to be bound by parallel human rights obligations.109 
If it is sufficient for Italy and Libya to be bound by parallel obligations, the 
applicants can argue that, although Libya is not a State party to the ECHR, it 
is bound by an equivalent treaty provision to Article 3 ECHR, namely Article 7 
ICCPR. If the same source is required, however, the applicants must show that 
Libya breached a specific provision of a Convention to which both Libya and 
Italy are parties, such as Article 7 ICCPR or Article 1 CAT, or a customary norm. 
In the present case, the applicants could argue that the ill-treatment by the 
-notion-of-place-of-safety-with-the-human-rights-of-migrants/#more-16220 (last accessed 
24 May 2018).
106   See for instance Heller & Pezzani (n. 3), p. 59–61; Amnesty International (n. 39), p. 35–37.
107   European Union External Action, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia Starts Training 
of Libyan Navy Coast Guard and Libyan Navy, 27 October 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/
node/13195_en (accessed 1 June 2018).
108   H. Moynihan, Aiding and Assisting: the Mental Element under Article 16 of the 
International Law Commission’s Articles on States Responsibility, 67(2) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 2018, p. 455–471, at p. 468. See also Aust (n. 84), p. 420; 
Crawford (n. 95), p. 408; Jackson (n. 73), p. 161; Lanovoy (n. 73), p. 240.
109   It can be argued that in the case of human rights violations it would be sufficient for them 
to be bound by the same norm. Compare Aust (n. 84), p. 263–264; Crawford (n. 95), p. 410; 
Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway (n. 8), p. 281.
Downloaded from Brill.com02/16/2021 09:31:21AM
via Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
420 Pijnenburg
European Journal of Migration and Law 20 (2018) 396–426
Libyan Coast Guard, the return to Libya where they are at risk of ill-treatment, 
and their ill-treatment in Libya could all qualify as breaches of Article 7 ICCPR, 
to which both Italy and Libya are bound. This would however raise the ques-
tion whether the ECtHR’s jurisdiction extends to interpreting human rights 
norms beyond the ECHR.
Indeed, Article 16 ARSIWA confronts the Court with the question of how to 
apply this provision: the question whether Italy incurs derived responsibility 
under Article 16 ARSIWA is different from the one the Court has to answer, 
namely whether Italy breached its obligations under the ECHR. In fact, the 
challenge is threefold. First, while jurisdiction is not a requirement for estab-
lishing responsibility under Article 16 ARSIWA, it is under Article 1 ECHR: if the 
Court finds that Italy did not exercise jurisdiction, it will declare the case inad-
missible and not have the opportunity to address Article 16 ARSIWA. Second, 
the ECHR on its face does not prohibit Italy from aiding or assisting the com-
mission of human rights violations by Libya. Rather, it places obligations on 
Italy not to commit human rights violations itself. Yet the Court’s jurisdic-
tion is limited to the establishing whether or not Italy complied with its ob-
ligations under the ECHR. On the other hand, the ECtHR has repeatedly held 
that ‘the provisions of treaties must be interpreted in good faith in the light 
of the object and purpose of the treaty and in accordance with the principle 
of effectiveness’.110 Last, in order to apply Article 16 ARSIWA, the Court would 
have to find that Libya committed an internationally wrongful act. However, 
its jurisdiction is limited to the responsibility of State parties under the ECHR. 
The Court has indeed confirmed that it should not rule on the lawfulness of 
activities of non-State parties.111 It has thus repeatedly held that ‘there is no 
question of adjudicating on or establishing the responsibility of the destina-
tion country, whether under general international law, under the Convention 
or otherwise.’112 Nevertheless, in expulsion or extradition cases involving non-
State parties, the Court indirectly assesses the situation in the receiving coun-
try in order to establish the responsibility of the expelling or extraditing State.113 
The Court could refer to these precedents to (indirectly) establish that Libya 
committed an internationally wrongful act.
110   Hirsi, para. 179. See also Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey [GC] Apps nos 46827/99 and 
46951/99 (ECtHR, 4 February 2005) para. 123.
111   M. den Heijer, Procedural Aspects of Shared Responsibility in the European Court of 
Human Rights, 4(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 2013, p. 361–383, at p. 373.
112   Soering v United Kingdom App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989) para. 91.
113   Den Heijer (n. 111), p. 374.
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One solution to these challenges could be for the Court to read Article 16 
ARSIWA into Article 3 ECHR, by interpreting the latter as including a prohi-
bition of aiding or assisting another State in breaching the prohibition of ill-
treatment. Thus, if another State breaches Article 3 and the respondent State 
is responsible under Article 16 ARSIWA for aiding or assisting the ill-treatment, 
the Court could hold that the respondent State breached its obligations under 
Article 3. This interpretation can be seen to build on the Court’s existing in-
terpretation of Article 3 ECHR as including a prohibition of refoulement and 
positive obligations more generally. Following this reasoning, Italy could be 
found to exercise jurisdiction and breach its obligations under Article 3 ECHR 
because it aided and assisted the LCG in returning the applicants to Libya. 
However, this interpretation would go beyond existing case-law.114
In sum, whether the Court finds that Italy incurs responsibility under Article 
16 would depend on its determination of the facts of the case and on its inter-
pretation of the requirements of Article 16 ARSIWA, as well as its understand-
ing of this provision’s relation to Article 3 ECHR. Therefore, although Article 
16 could prove a useful tool, it also presents the Court with many challenges 
which would require it to venture into uncharted territory.
6 Third Scenario: The Italian Authorities Give Instructions
As noted in Section 3.2, on 6 November 2017 the MRCC instructed both the LCG 
and the NGO vessel to head towards the boat in distress, while the Italian heli-
copter asked the Libyan vessel to stop when it was departing. Likewise, various 
other incidents have been reported whereby the MRCC in Rome gave instruc-
tions which led to migrant boats being rescued by the LCG instead of NGO 
ships.115 For instance, on 10 May 2017 the Italian MRCC received a distress call 
from a migrant boat and requested the NGO ship Sea Watch to intervene, but 
later instructed it to stand by because the LCG would be taking over on-scene 
114   In a similar vein, Jackson suggests that the ECtHR should interpret Article 3 ECHR as 
prohibiting States parties from facilitating ill-treatment by other actors, both on their 
territory and abroad. See M. Jackson, Freeing Soering: The ECHR, State Complicity in 
Torture and Jurisdiction, 27(3) European Journal of International Law 2016, p. 817–830; 
see also Jackson (n. 73), p. 199; D. Davitti & M. Fries, Offshore Processing and Complicity 
in Current EU Migration Policies (Part 2), EJIL: Talk! 11 October 2017, https://www 
.ejiltalk.org/offshore-processing-and-complicity-in-current-eu-migration-policies-part-2/ 
(accessed 19 September 2018).
115   Heller & Pezzani (n. 3), p. 64–82.
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command. The Libyan ship eventually intercepted the migrant boat and re-
turned its passengers to Libya.116 These incidents therefore raise the question 
of Italy’s responsibility for giving instructions to the LCG.
6.1 Extraterritorial Effects
Arguably, the giving of instructions by the Italian MRCC is a key element in 
the GLAN-ASGI case and similar incidents. The Court may therefore be called 
upon to determine whether the giving of instructions by the MRCC triggers 
Italy’s jurisdiction. One path which the Court could explore in this regard is 
to examine whether the instructions qualify as ‘acts that a state controls and 
carries out on its own territory, leading to a human rights violation on the terri-
tory of another state’.117 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that ‘acts of the 
Contracting States performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can 
constitute an exercise of jurisdiction by them within the meaning of Article 1 
of the Convention’.118 A few cases seem to support the view that the extrater-
ritorial effects of State conduct can trigger jurisdiction. They include several 
incidents in Cyprus whereby the victims were shot by Turkish troops while 
they were in or next to the buffer zone.119 Likewise, in various cases ‘the ECtHR 
116   Ibid, p. 64–65. See also A. Elumami, Libyan Coastguard turns back nearly 500 Migrants 
after Altercation with NGO Ship (Tripoli: Reuters, 10 May 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-europe-migrants-libya/libyan-coastguard-turns-back-nearly-500-migrants-
after-altercation-with-ngo-ship-idUSKBN1862Q2 (last accessed 24 May 2017); J.-P. Gauci, 
Back to Old Tricks? Italian Responsibility for Returning People to Libya, EJIL: Talk! 
6 June 2017, https://www.ejiltalk.org/back-to-old-tricks-italian-responsibility-for-returning 
-people-to-libya/ (accessed 11 August 2017).
117   P.V. Kessing, Transnational Operations Carried out from a State’s Own Territory: Armed 
Drones and the Extraterritorial Effect of International Human Rights Conventions, in: 
T. Gammeltoft-Hansen & J. Vedsted-Hansen (Eds), Human Rights and the Dark Side of 
Globalisation: Transnational Law Enforcement and Migration Control, Routledge Studies in 
Human Rights (Oxford: Routledge, 2017), p. 81–99, at p. 87. See also Gammeltoft-Hansen’s 
contribution in this special issue; K. Da Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of Selected 
Human Rights Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), p. 251–252; T. Gammeltoft-Hansen 
& J. Vedsted-Hansen, Introduction: Human Rights in an Age of International Cooperation, 
in: T. Gammeltoft-Hansen & J. Vedsted-Hansen (Eds), Human Rights and the Dark Side of 
Globalisation: Transnational Law Enforcement and Migration Control, Routledge Studies 
in Human Rights (Oxford: Routledge 2017), p. 1–24, at p. 10.
118   Hirsi, para. 72 (emphasis added). See also Banković, para. 67; Al-Skeini, para. 131; Drozd and 
Janousek, para. 91.
119   Andreou v Turkey [Admissibility] App no 45653/99 (ECtHR, 3 June 2008); Solomou v Turkey 
[Admissibility] App no 36832/97 (ECtHR, 18 may 1999); Isaak v Turkey [Admissibility] 
App no 44587/98 (ECtHR, 28 September 2006); Panayi v Turkey App no 45388/99 (ECtHR, 
27 October 2009).
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accepted that the Convention applied to executive or adjudicative measures 
which were specifically directed at persons resident abroad’.120
The ECtHR could thus conceive of the MRCC’s instructions as an act of the 
Italian State121 taking place on Italian territory (the MRCC is based in Rome) 
which has extraterritorial effects (the migrant boat was not in Italian territorial 
waters). However, the ECtHR would have to establish that there is a sufficiently 
close link between the instructions and the human rights violation. Kessing 
suggests that the ECtHR requires a direct and immediate causal link between 
the State act and human rights effect abroad.122
The Court would thus have to examine what constitutes the violation of 
Article 3 in order to assess whether there is a direct and immediate causal link. 
It could thus hold that the instructions led to the migrants being returned to 
Libya instead of being brought to Italy. However, Italy would likely argue that it 
only instructed the LCG to rescue the migrants and not to ill-treat them nor ex-
pose them to a risk of ill-treatment in Libya. The Court would therefore prob-
ably have to decide whether the fact that Italy knew or should have known that 
asking the LCG to carry out the rescue would expose the applicants to a risk of 
ill-treatment is a sufficiently close link. As established by Hirsi, this would be 
in breach of Article 3 ECHR because the applicants were exposed to the risk 
of being subjected to ill-treatment in Libya (and possibly chain refoulement).
Moreover, the Court could examine whether the cordoning off, beating, and 
departing while a person was hanging on the ladder outside the ship reaches 
the threshold of Article 3. Likewise, there have been other reports of the LCG 
using threats and violence against migrants and stealing their possessions 
as well as endangering migrants’ lives due to their reckless behaviour.123 The 
Court could therefore examine whether the treatment of the migrants at the 
hands of the LCG during the interception operation reached the threshold for 
120   Den Heijer (n. 8), p. 41. See for instance Haydarie and Others v the Netherlands App no 
8876/04 (ECtHR, 20 October 2005); Kovačič and Others v Slovenia Apps nos 44574/98, 
45133/98 and 48316/99 (ECtHR, 9 October 2003); Minasyan and Semerjyan v Armenia App 
no 27651/05 (ECtHR, 23 June 2009).
121   The MRCC in Rome can be considered a State organ in accordance with Article 4 ARSIWA: 
the annex to the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue requires 
States parties to make provision for the coordination of the facilities required to provide 
search and rescue services round their coasts and to establish a national machinery for 
the overall coordination of search and rescue services by establishing rescue coordina-
tion centres.
122   Kessing (n. 117), p. 91 and 93.
123   See for instance Heller & Pezzani (n. 3), p. 59–61; Amnesty International (n. 39), p. 35–37.
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Article 3.124 If this is the case, it could establish Italy’s responsibility on the 
ground that the MRCC’s instructions had the extraterritorial effect that the 
migrants’ rights under Article 3 were violated.
6.2 Direction and Control
Alternatively, the ECtHR could explore whether Article 17 ARSIWA is applica-
ble in this case. This provision holds that:
A State which directs and controls another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible 
for that act if:
a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the inter-
nationally wrongful act; and
b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State.
Article 17 shows many similarities with Article 16 ARSIWA, yet in terms of re-
sponsibility its function differs. Whereas under Article 16 Libya remains solely 
responsible for the pullbacks and Italy is responsible only for the aid or as-
sistance it provides, under Article 17 the responsibility for the pullbacks them-
selves is attributed both to Libya and to Italy.
However, Articles 16 and 17 ARSIWA present similar challenges as regards 
their application by the Court. Indeed, although Article 17 ARSIWA, like Article 
16, does not require Italy to exercise jurisdiction, without finding that Italy 
exercises jurisdiction the Court cannot apply this provision. Likewise, on its 
face the ECHR does not prohibit Italy from directing and controlling another 
State in committing human rights violations; and the Court does not have 
jurisdiction to establish Libya’s international responsibility.
As for Article 16 ARSIWA, the ECtHR could address these problems by inter-
preting Article 3 ECHR as including the prohibition of directing and controlling 
another State in committing human rights violations. Thus, if another State 
breaches Article 3 and the respondent State is responsible under Article 17 
ARSIWA for directing and controlling the ill-treatment, the Court could hold 
that the respondent State breached its own obligations under Article 3.
If the Court applies Article 17 ARSIWA, it would have to interpret the re-
quirements of this provision and decide if they are met in this case.125 First, 
124   Under Article 2 ECHR the applicants could also advance the argument that Italy failed to 
protect the migrants’ right to life by instructing the LCG who endangered their lives.
125   See also Moreno-Lax & Giuffré (n. 86).
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it would have to determine what constitutes the internationally wrongful act 
committed by Libya. This assessment would be similar to the one discussed 
with regard to Article 16 ARSIWA in Section 5.2 above. Second, the Court would 
have to find that the giving of instructions by the MRCC qualifies as direction 
and control. In that regard, as for Article 16 ARSIWA, it matters which conduct 
is deemed to constitute an internationally wrongful act on the part of Libya: 
it would be easier for the Court to find that the MRCC in Rome directed and 
controlled the migrants’ interception and return to Libya than to establish that 
it directed and controlled the ill-treatment of the intercepted migrants after 
their return to Libya.
Third, under Article 17(a) the Court would have to find that Italy knew of 
the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act. Unlike for Article 16 
ARSIWA, the Commentary to Article 17 does not suggest that the applicable 
standard may be closer to intent than knowledge. As noted above as regards 
Article 16 ARSIWA, the ECtHR could find that the knowledge requirement is 
met at least as regards exposing migrants to a risk of ill-treatment by returning 
them to Libya.
Last, Article 17(b) ARSIWA requires the Court to find that ‘the completed act 
would have been wrongful had it been committed by the directing and control-
ling State itself.’126 The Commentary to the ARSIWA specifies that
This condition is significant in the context of bilateral obligations, which 
are not opposable to the directing State. In cases of multilateral obliga-
tions and especially of obligations to the international community, it is of 
much less significance. The essential principle is that a State should not 
be able to do through another what it could not do itself.’127
Hirsi has already established that returning migrants to Libya breached Italy’s 
obligations under the Convention, and the Court would likely find that if Italian 
agents ill-treated or tortured migrants this would violate Article 3 ECHR. Thus, 
it seems that this last requirement would not confront the Court with many 
difficulties.
More generally, as in the case of Article 16 ARSIWA, whether Italy incurs 
responsibility under Article 17 depends on the ECtHR’s determination of the 
specific facts of the case and on its interpretation of the requirements of 
126   International Law Commission (n. 72), p. 69, para. 8.
127   Ibid.
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Article 17,128 as well as its understanding of this provision’s relation to Article 3 
ECHR. Insofar as direction and control suggests a higher level of leverage on the 
part of Italy, it seems more likely that the requirements of Article 16 ARSIWA 
are met than those of Article 17 ARSIWA.
7 Conclusion
This article has discussed different avenues which the ECtHR could explore 
when deciding on the application filed by GLAN and ASGI, which challenges 
Italy’s involvement in Libyan pullback policies. The foregoing analysis sug-
gests that the Court can draw on different strands of its case-law and refer to 
various concepts and doctrines when deciding this case. Although none of the 
approaches discussed above seem to yield a clear answer to the question of 
Italy’s responsibility under the Convention, some avenues may increase the 
likelihood that the ECtHR will find that Italy exercises jurisdiction and incurs 
responsibility, while others may limit it. Moreover, although the analysis in this 
article focused on specific elements of the case, the Court can of course com-
bine various approaches when examining the case as a whole. Thus, while it 
may find that a specific element may not be sufficient to trigger Italy’s jurisdic-
tion and/or responsibility, it may rule that the accumulation of factors does.
It seems that the biggest challenge for the applicants will be to convince 
the Court that Italy exercised jurisdiction. The Court, in turn, could draw on 
various strands of case-law, some of which may enable it to find that Italy ex-
ercised jurisdiction. It could also refer to the law of State responsibility, espe-
cially Articles 16 and 17 ARSIWA, in order to assess whether Italy is responsible. 
More specifically, it seems that the bolder the Court is in terms of treading 
uncharted territories, both in terms of establishing that Italy exercised juris-
diction and applying the provisions on derived responsibility in the ARSIWA, 
the more likely it is to find that Italy is responsible. While the facts of this case 
may thus prompt the ECtHR to engage with broader international law norms, 
it may also choose to ‘play it safe’ both legally and politically by staying within 
the boundaries of its existing case-law. On the other hand, although the con-
text of this case may not be propitious for such an undertaking, neither would 
it be the first time that the Court takes it case-law, and thereby human rights 
protection, a step further.
128   Moreno-Lax & Giuffré (n. 86) suggest that EU Member States may incur responsibility for 
Libyan pullbacks under Article 17 ARSIWA.
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